PRINCE2 and its use – or non-use - in Government Projects

PRINCE2 is owned by the British government (i.e. it is owned by The Office of Government Commerce, part of the Treasury Department). It is part of its recommended ‘Best Practice’ for all types of project. So why are there government projects that either fail or could have been performed much more efficiently and effectively?

First, one has to realize that PRINCE2 is recommended, not mandated. There is an English saying that ‘you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink’. Similarly, although PRINCE2 is available to them, not all government projects make use of it. When we look at establishments which either have or had close ties to government, such as police departments, public utilities (water, electricity, railways), we find PRINCE2 adopted and many very successful projects being the result. But in government there are many departments that don’t currently use the method.

There are many reasons for the (relative) failure of some government projects. Let’s have a look at a number of these.

First, politicians do not always take kindly to the discipline of PRINCE2 or any project management method that requires them to identify all their requirements at the beginning of the project – and then stick to those requirements. Too often they like to announce to the public that they have started a project to react immediately to a perceived problem – usually one that has just received some adverse publicity in the media. One example was the reaction some years ago in England to adverse publicity about the disease affecting coal miners who got coal dust in their lungs. A feasibility study was rushed through and the project was launched with a budget suitable to the cost forecast in the feasibility. Before long it was realized that the equipment required would cost far more than originally thought and the whole project was restarted with a more realistic budget. The problem then was that the responsible minister had already announced in parliament that the pension scheme for these miners would be ready by date x, and there was no way he was prepared to say publicly that this would be delayed. So everything else, such as cost and quality had to be sacrificed in order to meet the deadline. Luckily this project was run under PRINCE2, so all the impacts, options – and cause of the change – were documented and the project limped through to some semblance of success. The difficulty is caused by – in this case - ministers liking the feel of power and the good publicity of announcing a date by which they have ordained that a solution to a problem will be available. (This also happens in private business).

Linked to this is the problem that politicians, for similar reasons, like to change their minds, and we know what that does to important project items such as target dates and cost. Changing their minds about requirements – usually adding, rather than taking requirements away – is not always matched by a willingness to make appropriate changes to budget and we have already mentioned the reluctance to amend target dates. I was consulting in a government project when we met to discuss the Project Initiation Document. One point that worried us was that the Project Plan slightly exceeded the cost tolerance – set again on the basis of a brief feasibility study. The Executive replied that he had already had one fight with the minister in order to obtain the budget that had been forecast in the feasibility study, and he wasn’t about to go back and ask for more!

I was asked recently to Team Manage the delivery of the major product of a project. The Project Manager, working for a quasi-governmental establishment, had produced a Stage Plan without any reference to me. When I estimated the work, it lasted 3 weeks longer than the Stage Plan. When I pointed this out, I discovered that the target date had been set in order to meet a government deadline, nothing to do with how much work was involved.

Another major reason for the failure of some government projects is the lack of understanding of the PRINCE2 concepts. One military project was handed down to the Fleet Air Arm. It was a small project, but the issuing body was insisting that there must be at least one person identified for each PRINCE2 role in the project management team. It was very nice to have PRINCE2 mandated, but this was not accompanied by any real understanding of PRINCE2, such as the philosophy of tailoring the organization structure, combining roles.

One point about government projects that we mustn’t ignore is that the users tend to be a very large body, i.e. the general public, and it is almost impossible to get agreement on what is needed from such a diverse set of users.

One point that always comes to my mind – although I am accused of being too cynical – is that in government project people are not spending their own money. Those developing the solution tend to be external suppliers and their view of the public’s purse (and that of a number of people in government or public service) is very different to those of the general public. Add this to the tendency to write vague statements of requirement or changes of mind on what is required and you have a recipe for project disaster.

I mentioned that there are government departments that do not use PRINCE2. One department insisted for a long time in continuing its use of a variation of the original method from which PRINCE2 came.

Although PRINCE2 was a major improvement and contained many new features, we were up against that old enemy, reluctance to change; the worry of having to relearn. So, although PRINCE2 is owned by the U.K. government, not all of its employees use the method.
Many managers are ‘too busy’ to learn it and, of course, PRINCE2’s philosophy is that the Project Board carries ultimate responsibility for a project – not a point appreciated by a number of people in these positions of responsibility.

Colin Bentley